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One of the most delightful things about this law review Symposium is
that, unlike many other law review symposiums, we have been asked a
question that is very hard to answer: What did the constitutional
provisions protecting economic rights, including the Fifth Amendment’s
Takings Clause—the subject of this essay—originally mean? I am
particularly honored to be a part of the discussion because another
delightful thing about this Symposium is that the authors sharing this
* Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. Thanks go to the Center for the
Study of Constitutional Originalism at the University of San Diego School of Law for
inviting me to participate in this conference. I am also indebted to Amy Barrett, David
Barron, A.J. Bellia, Tricia Bellia, Rick Garnett, and Bill Kelley, among others, for
helpful comments and suggestions. Jessica Laux provided excellent research assistance.
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issue—present company excepted—happen to be the very individuals
who have thought most seriously about and produced the best scholarship
examining that very question. And, while I do profess to be an originalist,
my originalism is of the armchair, rather than academic, variety. Very
little of my scholarship focuses on the Takings Clause at all, and that
which does is admittedly both history free and full of the soft law and
economics utilitarian analysis that Dean Treanor has correctly observed
dominates academic discussions of takings problems.1
It is thus as an armchair originalist that I pose three questions about
the use of history to support the dominant academic view that the
compensation requirement of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, as
originally understood, extended only to physical appropriations or
invasions of private property by the government. This position, which I
will refer to as the “standard account” or “standard historical account,”
certainly has attracted forceful dissents in the academy, most notably by
the authors featured in this Symposium issue. The view that Takings
Clause protection against so-called regulatory takings is ahistorical,
however, is commonly accepted enough to earn the endorsement of even
Justice Scalia, who is both an originalist and a supporter of regulatory
takings protection.2
My first question about the standard historical account concerns the
frequent reliance on the prevalence of colonial and founding era land use
regulations to support the inference that the Takings Clause could not
have been intended to reach regulatory takings. In light of evidence
suggesting that the founding generation knew about pervasive land use
regulation, the argument goes, then surely the men who proposed, adopted,
and ratified the Fifth Amendment also knew how to mandate compensation
for regulatory takings.3 The inference, while logical enough, suffers from
two related difficulties. First, when ratified, the Fifth Amendment only
1. Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Domain,
105 MICH. L. REV. 101, 104–05 (2006); Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Public-Use Question
as a Takings Problem, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 934, 936–37 (2003). See also William
Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political
Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 811 (1995) (characterizing dominant analysis in
Takings literature). This characterization of my own work is not intended to denigrate
the excellent law and economics commentary, of both the soft and hard varieties, on the
Takings Clause.
2. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 n.15 (1992) (“[E]arly
constitutional theorists did not believe the Takings Clause embraced regulations of
property at all.”).
3. See John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern
Takings Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1252, 1283 (1996) [hereinafter Hart,
Colonial Land Use Law]; John F. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic and the
Original Meaning of the Takings Clause, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1099, 1101 (2000)
[hereinafter Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic].
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reached federal action, and the federal government lacked authority, in
most cases, to enact the kinds of police power regulations that tend to
raise regulatory takings questions.4 In other words, the enumerated
powers provided far more comprehensive protection against regulatory
takings than the Takings Clause. Second, legal historians have tended to
conflate local land use regulations with those enacted by state—or
colonial—governments.5 Yet, the import of local regulations is significantly
complicated by the fact that the distinction between “public” corporations—
municipalities—and “private” ones—General Motors, was not completely
developed until at least the early decades of the nineteenth century, and
for some purposes, not until later.6 Therefore, land use regulations imposed
by cities like New York and Boston, especially during the colonial era,
might not be perfectly analogous to modern land use restrictions.
My second two questions about the historical record supporting the
standard account concern the interpretive weight attributed to state court
decisions either interpreting a state constitutional compensation requirement,
or in the absence of such a provision, discerning whether government
action nonetheless necessitates compensation. Early state decisions certainly
provide important insights into the original meaning of the Takings Clause.
Particularly to the extent that they were asked to resolve questions
analogous to today’s regulatory takings problems, state court decisions
can shed light on what the operative terms of the Takings Clause
objectively meant at the time of the founding. For example, would a
member of the founding generation have understood the word take to
sometimes cover confiscatory regulations? Would he have understood
property in a limited “thing-like” sense or a more modern relational
one?7
My first question about the use of state cases to understand what the
Federal Takings Clause means is temporal; the second is substantive.
Historians of the Takings Clause frequently draw upon cases decided

4. See Barron v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250–51
(1833) (holding that the Takings Clause only applies to takings by the federal
government).
5. See Hart, Colonial Land Use Law, supra note 3, at 1273–79 (discussing state
and local regulation); Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic, supra note 3, at 1107–
13 (same). See also generally WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND
REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 1, 3, 6, 10, 16 (1996) (same).
6. See infra notes 42–54 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE
L.J. 1163, 1188–91 (1999) (discussing competing conceptions of property).
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well into the nineteenth century to support various, and competing,
conclusions about the original reach of the compensation requirement.8
Yet, it is unclear to me what weight should be given to the reasoning of
judges separated from the founding by more than a generation or so. As
many scholars, including, again, other contributors to this Symposium,
have observed, the thinking about economic and property rights underwent
a profound ideological shift during the late eighteenth and early
twentieth centuries.9 While I am ill-equipped to resolve the academic
debate over the extent to which this shift had taken hold by the time of
the Fifth Amendment’s ratification, the shift itself complicates the already
problematic reliance on nineteenth century cases to elucidate the meaning
of a late eighteenth century legal provision.10
A final difficulty with the use of state cases is that they are relevant to
original meaning analysis only to the extent that nineteenth century state
courts were asking the same questions as modern courts faced with
regulatory takings claims. But, as Eric Claeys’s work suggests, it is not
entirely clear whether they were asking the same questions.11 If nineteenth
century courts were asked to resolve different questions than twentieth
and twenty-first century ones, then the evidentiary weight of their
decisions is significantly undermined.
I. THE TAKINGS CLAUSE AND THE PROBLEM OF HISTORY
About the only thing conclusively established regarding the history of
the Takings Clause is that the history of the Takings Clause plays little
or no role in the Supreme Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence.12
The cases are peppered with apparently ahistorical gems, from Justice
Holmes’s admonition in Pennsylvania Coal that a regulation that “goes

8.
9.

See infra notes 61–65 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 29–34, 54–58, 101–02 (2d ed. 1998)
(discussing the evolution of thought about economic life during the nineteenth century);
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860 (1977)
(same); Treanor, supra note 1, at 819–27 (same).
10. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, History Lean: The Reconciliation of Private
Property and Representative Government, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 591, 593–94 (1995)
(arguing that the founding generation strongly endorsed private property rights); Martin
S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
523, 561–63 (1995) (challenging Epstein’s characterization).
11. See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights,
88 CORNELL L. REV. 1549, 1562–63 (2003) (challenging the dominant interpretation of
nineteenth century takings cases).
12. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 29 (1985) (“Historical arguments have played virtually no role in the
actual interpretation of the clause.”).
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too far” effects a taking,13 to Chief Justice Rehnquist’s articulation of a
Goldilocks rule for regulatory exactions in Dolan: “We think the
‘reasonable relationship’ test adopted by a majority of the state courts is
closer to the federal constitutional norm than either of those previously
discussed.”14 In fact, many scholars have argued that the most prominent
exception to the Court’s practice of disregarding history when resolving
regulatory takings claims—Justice Scalia’s invocation of “the restrictions
that background principles of the State’s law of property and nuisance
already place upon land ownership”15—was ill-conceived.16
Why the Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence has remained ahistorical
is, in one sense, a puzzle. After all, regulatory takings doctrine arguably
underwent its most significant evolution during the decades when we all
became originalists. The Justices in the majority of the decisions reflecting
that evolution were, without question, the Court’s most consistent
originalists.17 One way to resolve this puzzle of non-originalism among
originalists would be to assume that proponents of strong regulatory
takings protection are favoring results-driven, rather than principledriven, outcomes. For example, Justice Scalia’s admonition in Lucas
that “[t]he practices of the States prior to incorporation of the Takings
and Just Compensation Clauses, . . . were out of accord with any plausible
interpretation of those provisions,”18 is, as William Treanor observed,
arguably “at odds with his announced commitment to a doctrine of
originalism and his explanation of what originalism means.”19
Another explanation for the Court’s ahistorical approach to the
Takings Clause—and perhaps for the regulatory takings “muddle”

13. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
14. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
15. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
16. Lynn E. Blais, Takings, Statutes and the Common Law: Considering Inherent
Limitations on Title, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1996); Eric T. Freyfogle, The Owning and
Taking of Sensitive Lands, 43 UCLA L. REV. 77, 79 (1995); Bradley C. Karkkainen, The
Police Power Revisited: Phantom Incorporation and the Roots of the Takings “Muddle,”
90 MINN. L. REV. 826, 837 (2006); Richard J. Lazarus, The Measure of a Justice: Justice
Scalia and the Faltering of the Property Rights Movement Within the Supreme Court, 57
HASTINGS L.J. 759, 759–61 (2006).
17. Jeffrey Rosen, Originalist Sin, THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 5, 1997, at 26 (“We
are all originalists now.”). See also Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001);
Dolan, 512 U.S. at 374; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1003; Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483
U.S. 825 (1987).
18. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028 n.15.
19. Treanor, supra note 1, at 808.
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generally20—is the fact that the Takings Clause is itself a historical
puzzle. Not only is the Takings Clause the only provision of the Bill of
Rights that was not requested by a state ratifying convention, but there
was also apparently not one word of discussion about it at the time it was
proposed and ratified—not in Congress, either before or after its
proposal, or in the states, either before or after its ratification.21
Moreover, unlike many other provisions of the Constitution, the
Takings Clause had no colonial or British antecedents: No colonial
charter mandated compensation, even for physical appropriations, in all
cases.22 Only two Colonies provided any per se protection against seizures,
and only one of these protections—Massachusetts’s compensation
requirement for seizures of personal property—was fully implemented.23
The first state to adopt a takings clause, post Revolution, was Vermont
in 1777; many states did not adopt takings clauses until well into the
nineteenth century.24 While colonial—and later state—governments
routinely compensated owners when their property was seized,
compensation was a matter of legislative grace, rather than fundamental
entitlement.25 Some scholars, notably William Treanor and Morton
Horwitz, have argued that founding-era governments routinely refused
to compensate owners when property was seized for roads.26 This
reading of the historical evidence has been challenged, especially by
James Ely, who argues that cases of noncompensation, far from being
routine, were the rare exception to an expectation that any seizure
required compensation.27
The Takings Clause, however, represented a profound departure from
voluntary remuneration practices, whatever their extent, by mandating
just compensation for all takings by the federal government. This
reality—that the Takings Clause was itself ahistorical—poses a particular

20. See generally Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is
Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 562–63, 594–96 (1984) (characterizing takings
doctrine as a “muddle”).
21. See, e.g., Treanor, supra note 1, at 791.
22. Id. at 785.
23. Id. at 785–86 & nn.12 & 14 (citing Mass. Body of Liberties § 8 (1641) and
Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina art. 44 (1669)) (“Perhaps because the attempts to
put the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina into operation were unsuccessful, . . .
leading accounts have considered the Massachusetts [provision] . . . the only colonial
precursor of the Takings Clause.”).
24. HORWITZ, supra note 9, at 63–64, 66; Treanor, supra note 1, at 789–91.
25. See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 9, at 65–66; Treanor, supra note 1, at 785, 788–
89.
26. HORWITZ, supra note 9, at 63–65; Treanor, supra note 1, at 787–88.
27. See James W. Ely, Jr., “That Due Satisfaction May be Made:” The Fifth
Amendment and the Origins of the Compensation Principle, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 4–
14 (1992).
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problem for originalists: In contrast to, for example, the Fourth
Amendment’s reasonableness requirement, it is impossible to draw upon
pre-founding era interpretations of similar rights because there were
none.28 One side effect of the Takings Clause’s ahistorical status has
been the dominance of “original intent” scholarship seeking to recover
the subjective meaning of the Clause’s terms to the elite group of men
who proposed and ratified it.29 The writings of James Madison, who
proposed the provision—apparently out of the blue—play a significant
role in these academic exercises, for obvious reasons,30 as does the
intellectual and ideological backdrop against which the Clause was
proposed and ratified.31
II. THE TAKINGS CLAUSE AND ORIGINALISM: THREE
HISTORICAL PUZZLES
As an armchair adherent to the now dominant “original meaning”
originalism, the questions posed by this essay shy away from these
original intent debates. This essay focuses instead on the historical
evidence used to support the conclusion that the terms of the Takings
Clause objectively excluded regulatory takings, rather than on the
evidence hinting at the ratifiers’ and Framers’ subjective understanding
of the provision. This historical evidence falls into two general categories:
inquiries into the regulatory practices during the colonial and founding
eras, and cases interpreting state takings clause analogs.
A. Colonial and Founding Era Land Use Regulations
In Euclid v. Ambler Realty, the seminal case upholding comprehensive
zoning, Justice Sutherland explained:
28. See, e.g., TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
38–41 (1969) (using British practices and history to elucidate the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment); Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV.
757, 764 (1994) (same). See also Treanor, supra note 1, at 785–87 (observing that
colonial charters lacked compensation guarantees).
29. See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION
OF LIBERTY 89–91 (2004); Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L.
REV. 327, 341 n.51 (2002).
30. See Treanor, supra note 1, at 791 (arguing that, absent a ratification record,
“Madison’s statements thus provide unusually significant evidence about what the clause
was originally understood to mean.”).
31. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 9, at 29–34, 54–58 (discussing the intellectual history
of the Takings Clause); EPSTEIN, supra note 12, at 19–31 (same).
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Building zone laws are of modern origin. They began in this country about
twenty-five years ago. Until recent years, urban life was comparatively simple;
but with the great increase and concentration of population, problems have
developed, and constantly are developing, which require, and will continue to
require, additional restrictions in respect of the use and occupation of private
lands in urban communities.32

It is now well accepted that Sutherland’s tale was mythological.
Notably, scholars such as John Hart have established that land use
regulations were a pervasive fact of life during the colonial and founding
eras.33 For example, fire codes prohibited the erection of wooden
buildings and permitted local authorities to demolish sound houses to
prevent further conflagration; affirmative use requirements mandated
that owners improve both agricultural and urban property; poor laws
empowered local authorities to take over the property of dissolute
residents in order to generate support for family members; local, colonial,
and state codes regulated the location and even appearance of buildings;
and the rights of land speculators were dramatically curtailed.34
Compensation for the economic losses sustained as a result of these
regulations was rare. On the other hand, owners were usually, but not
always, compensated when their property was seized for public use.35
Some scholars, including John Hart, have used the fact that the
Takings Clause was proposed and ratified against this backdrop of
pervasive land use regulation to argue that the Clause could not have
been intended to mandate compensation for regulatory takings.36 Hart
argues:
If anyone had felt that contemporary manifestations of the power to regulate
land use unreasonably threatened landowners’ autonomy, then the period
surrounding the ratification of the Constitution would have been a good time to
speak up and propose constitutionalizing land use law. . . . Instead, Congress
adopted a compensation provision in 1789 covering only “property . . . taken for
public use.” . . . If the first Congress had wanted to shift the boundary line
between public power and private prerogative, so that regulation as well as
appropriation of land were subject to review under the new Takings Clause, that
would have been a great novelty. We should not read such a novelty into a text
without some clear evidence showing that contemporaries understood it that
way.37

32. 272 U.S. 365, 386–87 (1926).
33. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law, supra note 3, at 1259–81; Hart, Land Use Law
in the Early Republic, supra note 3, at 1007–1131.
34. See NOVAK, supra note 5, at 68; Hart, Colonial Land Use Law, supra note 3, at
1259, 1277, 1280; Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic, supra note 3, at 1109–14,
1123.
35. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic, supra note 3, at 1134.
36. See id. at 1133–35; Treanor, supra note 1, at 787–91.
37. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic, supra note 3, at 1133–35 (footnotes
omitted).
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Even after accepting the record of land use regulations amassed by
Hart and others, I am not sure that it supports the inference suggested by
Hart. I agree that neither the Congress that adopted the Takings Clause,
nor the states that ratified it, intended to disrupt local and state
regulatory practices. But, of course, these men did not intend, with the
Fifth Amendment, to disrupt state and local compensation practices at
all. At the time that it was ratified, the Fifth Amendment did not apply
to the states any more so than did the Establishment Clause.38 Just as the
first Congress did not understand the First Amendment’s Establishment
Clause to require states to disestablish their official churches, it also did
not understand the Takings Clause to mandate compensation, even for
physical takings, in the states. And, just as several states continued to
maintain established churches in the decades following the First Amendment’s
ratification, a number of states also did not adopt a takings clause until
well into the nineteenth century.39
Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that the members of the first
Congress and of the ratification conventions believed that the enumerated
powers would dramatically limit opportunities for federal regulation of
private property. Indeed, the Constitution does explicitly address the
federal power to regulate property, but in Article IV, not in the Takings
Clause. Article IV, Section 3, provides, “The Congress shall have Power to
dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the
Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.”40 If, at the
time of the founding, the accepted view was that federal regulatory
powers were extremely circumscribed, silence on the matter of regulation
might not necessarily indicate a blanket approval of confiscatory
regulations. To be sure, on a few occasions, the federal government did
exercise its enumerated powers to regulate territorial affairs in ways that
limited private property owners’ rights—for example, by imposing
forfeiture penalties for nonresidence.41 Congress also declined to

38. See Barron v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250–51
(1833).
39. See GERARD V. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA 20–24
(1987) (noting that many states, especially in New England, maintained established
churches after the ratification of the First Amendment; Massachusetts became the last to
disestablish its church in 1833). For the state takings clauses, I actually had a research
librarian look up when they were adopted: Connecticut (1818); Maine (1819); Florida
(1838); Rhode Island (1842); New Jersey (1844); New York (1846).
40. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
41. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic, supra note 3, at 1139–42.
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exercise its power to review territorial land use regulations, including
a number of affirmative use requirements as well as provisions authorizing
a majority of landowners to compel nonconsenting owners to participate in
cooperative arrangements.42 In my view, these regulations, as opposed
to the regulatory practices of state and local governments, go much
further toward supporting the idea that the Takings Clause did not reach
regulatory takings.
I offer one final question about the use of colonial and founding era
regulatory practices to support the proposition that the Takings Clause
only reached physical takings, although it is so tentative as to be better
described as a musing. Scholars examining the historical land use regulatory
practices during the colonial era and the early nineteenth century frequently
treat regulations enacted by towns and cities as interchangeable with
colonial or state regulations. Yet, I wonder whether characterizing local
rules regulating property, especially during the colonial period, as
analogous to modern “land use regulations” might be making a category
error.
A city’s legal status can only be fully understood against the backdrop
of the historical evolution of the modern American corporation. Prior to
the early nineteenth century, American law made no distinction between
public and private corporations. A corporation was a corporation—a
legally distinct entity empowered by a legislative charter to carry out
defined purposes, which we today would consider both public and
private.43 The hybrid legal status of corporations, which had ancient
roots, is relatively easy to understand in the new world context because
many colonial cities—consider William Penn’s Philadelphia—were
closely analogous to today’s “planned unit developments.” Then, as in some
cases today, the “developer”—in the colonial context, often a chartered
corporation—retained some regulatory rights as landowner.44
During the early years of the nineteenth century, American legal
thinking underwent a remarkable transformation—namely, the conceptual
separation of the private and public generally, and of private and public
corporations in particular.45 Business corporations became independent

42. Id. at 1144–45.
43. See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 9, at 111–22; Gerald E. Frug, The City as a
Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 105, 1101–02 (1980).
44. See Joan Williams, The Development of the Public/Private Distinction in
American Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 225, 228 (1985) (reviewing HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC
PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER: THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN
AMERICAN LAW (1983)).
45. See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 9, at 112–14 (discussing development of the
distinction between public and private); Frug, supra note 43, at 1100–04 (discussing
separation of public and municipal corporations); Williams, supra note 44, at 232–35
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rights holders, constitutionally protected from unreasonable state
interference.46 Moreover, the gradual erosion of the ultra vires doctrine
and the passage of general incorporation laws guaranteed the proliferation
of private corporations with broad authority to engage in a wide range of
activities.47 In contrast, municipal corporations came to be viewed as
subordinate to, and carrying out the purposes of, the states.48 By the late
nineteenth century, private corporations were well on their way toward
autonomy,49 while municipal corporations had become local governments
subject to state domination.50
To the extent that local regulatory practices are relevant to original
intent analysis—and, for the reasons discussed above, I am skeptical that
they are—I wonder if we need to better understand whether an informed
citizen would have categorized a local land use regulation as a public or
private act, or some hybrid. By the time of Dartmouth College, the
conceptual severance of public and private was developed well enough
to be accorded constitutional significance by the Supreme Court.51 Certainly
by that time, state courts had begun to recognize the regulatory actions
of local governments as public exercises of the police power.52 On the
other hand, Hedrik Hartog’s excellent case study of New York suggests
that as late as 1850, most New Yorkers viewed the city, in some sense,
as both public and private.53 Moreover, there clearly were regional

(discussing the role of municipal corporations in the development of the distinction
between public and private).
46. See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 9, at 111–14.
47. See HORWITZ, supra note 9, at 77–78; Frug, supra note 43, at 1101 (describing
the “Jacksonian effort to pass general incorporation laws, thus allowing the ‘privilege’ of
incorporation to be exercised by all.”).
48. See, e.g., Frug, supra note 43, at 1100–04.
49. Cf. William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical
Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1485 (1988) (describing “[t]he
Middle Period [of corporate development]—the 1850s to the 1880s,” when “[t]he states
enacted ‘general corporation laws’ to assure equal access to the corporate form . . . .”);
David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 208 (noting that “[t]he
pervasive adoption of general incorporation statutes by many states during the latter half
of the 19th century did not signal abdication of the regulatory notion of corporate law.”).
50. Frug, supra note 43, at 1108 (describing how local autonomy gave way to state
control in the late nineteenth century).
51. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 617 (1819).
52. See, e.g., Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass. (13 Tyng) 272, 272, 278 (1816); Eustis
v. Parker, 1 N.H. 273, 275 (1818).
53. HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER: THE CORPORATION
OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN AMERICAN LAW 1730–1870, at 4–5, 240–41, 256–60
(1983).
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differences in popular perceptions of local actions.54 It strikes me that
these perceptions might be relevant to the categorization of both local
regulations and perhaps also of colonial laws empowering local governments
to regulate property—which we today would call enabling acts.55
B. State Cases and the Federal Takings Clause
My final two questions both concern the use of nineteenth century
state cases to discern the original meaning of the terms of the Fifth
Amendment’s Takings Clause. In the Takings Clause context, there are
virtually no federal decisions interpreting the Fifth Amendment’s
compensation requirement until the late nineteenth century, perhaps in
large part because the federal government relied upon states to condemn
property for it.56 This has led a number of scholars to mine volumes of
early state court reports in an effort to uncover whether state courts ever
held that state constitutional provisions akin to the Takings Clause
required compensation for regulatory takings.57
In a footnote in Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, Justice Scalia hinted
that these cases were “entirely irrelevant”58 to modern takings analysis
because they were decided prior to the incorporation of the Takings
Clause in 1897.59 While, for the reasons discussed above, I wonder if
early state and local regulatory practices are probative of the original
meaning of the Takings Clause, it strikes me that early decisions
interpreting state law takings analogues are probative. At least to the
extent that these decisions resolved questions akin to the modern
regulatory takings dilemma—that is, whether regulations diminishing
property value ran afoul of constitutional protections that mirror the
Takings Clause—they can help us understand what the terms of the
Takings Clause meant at the time it was enacted. As my colleague A.J.
54. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 44, at 231–38 (contrasting New York and New
England traditions).
55. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law, supra note 3, at 1274–84 (discussing colonial
era laws empowering or mandating local land use regulations).
56. Treanor, supra note 1, at 794.
57. See, e.g., id. at 792–94; see also, e.g., Claeys, supra note 11, at 1553–54;
Andrew S. Gold, Regulatory Takings and Original Intent: The Direct, Physical Takings
Thesis “Goes Too Far,” 49 AM. U. L. REV. 181, 228–40 (1999); Kris W. Kobach, The
Origins of Regulatory Takings: Setting the Record Straight, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 1211,
1285–87.
58. 505 U.S. at 1028, n.15 (“Justice Blackmun expends a good deal of throwweight of his own upon a noncombatant, arguing that our description of the
‘understanding’ of land ownership that informs the Takings Clause is not supported by
early American experience. That is largely true, but entirely irrelevant. The practices of
the States prior to incorporation of the Takings and Just Compensation Clauses . . . were out
of accord with any plausible interpretation of those provisions.”).
59. See Chicago B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236–38 (1897).
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Bellia has noted, during the early years of the Republic, state court
decisions often provide the best evidence about the meaning of a federal
provision because, especially during those first decades, state courts did
the overwhelming majority of all judicial work, including the work of
interpreting the Constitution and federal statutes.60 There are, however,
two difficulties with using this state court evidence: identifying the
temporal range of decisions relevant to original meaning analysis and
making sure that the state courts were in fact responding to questions
akin to modern regulatory takings claims.
1. Early Cases, Not Late Ones?
My first question about state court evidence is certainly not unique to
the takings context: In relying on early decisional law to discern the
original meaning of a constitutional provision, it is, of course, important
to cabin the universe of relevant cases to those most likely to reflect
founding era understanding of relevant legal terms. As Justice Thomas
observed in Kelo v. New London, the probative value of state court
decisions diminishes dramatically as time passes.61 Since judicial
interpretations of constitutional provisions may evolve over time, the
farther away from the founding, the greater the risk that a decision
reflects a modern, rather than a founding era, understanding.62
The difficulty is that there are relatively few cases interpreting state
takings clauses in the years following the ratification of the Fifth
Amendment.63 This is not surprising in light of the fact that only eight
states—fewer than half of the total number admitted—adopted takings
clauses before 1815, roughly a generation after the founding.64 The
60. Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., State Courts and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes,
59 VAND. L. REV. 1501, 1504–07 (2006).
61. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 513–14 (2005) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (noting that mid-nineteenth century cases are not “deeply probative” of the
Fifth Amendment’s original meaning).
62. See id. at 514.
63. See, e.g., FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., THE TAKINGS ISSUE: A STUDY OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY TO REGULATE THE USE OF
PRIVATELY-OWNED LAND WITHOUT PAYING COMPENSATION TO THE OWNERS 106–07
(1973); Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding the Nineteenth Century Contract Clause: The
Role of the Property-Privilege Distinction and “Takings” Clause Jurisprudence, 60 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1, 75–76 (1986).
64. VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. I, art. II; MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, art. X; PA.
CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 10; KY. CONST. art. 12, § 12 (1792); DEL. CONST. of 1792, art.
I, § 8; ILL. CONST.; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 21 (1796); OHIO CONST. art. VIII, § 4 (1802).
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relative paucity of early decisional law has led some scholars to extend
the universe of cases relevant to original meaning analysis well into the
nineteenth century.65 This strikes me as problematic, especially in light
of the dramatic shifts in both the reality of, and philosophical or ideological
thinking about, economic life during the nineteenth century—changes
which may make the risk of interpretive drift particularly sharp in the
Takings Clause context.
2. The Same Questions, Not Different Ones?
Several scholars have challenged the standard characterization of early
state decisions as limiting compensation to physical takings.66 Having
not exhaustively reviewed the case law, I leave the battle over the weight
of the judicial record to those who have. But, I would like to close by
raising a different question about the characterization of early state
cases. It strikes me that the decisions which are most probative of
whether the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, as originally understood,
was meant to mandate compensation for regulatory takings are those that
(1) interpreted state constitutional provisions substantially similar to the
Federal Takings Clause—that is, by prohibiting “takings” without “just
compensation”—and (2) resolved questions akin to the modern regulatory
takings claim—that is, by addressing if or when a regulation that “goes
too far” becomes a taking. If a state takings provision departed dramatically
from the text of the Takings Clause or the courts were resolving different
questions, then the case law’s probative value diminishes dramatically.
The principle danger of relying on early state cases is not a problem of
constitutional text—most state takings clauses closely paralleled their
federal counterpart—but rather the risk of anachronism: We might read
decisions to be responding to the questions we expect in the regulatory
takings context when in fact the courts were asking and answering quite
different ones. For example, Eric Claeys has argued that nineteenth
century courts “did not organize takings cases under the same categories
that we apply now,” but rather divided the regulatory world between
valid “regulations” and invalid or compensatory “invasions” of property
rights.67 And, more recently, Bradley Karkkainen has argued that modern
courts and scholars have misread two seminal federal decisions, Chicago
B. & Q.68 and Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,69 as takings cases—
65. See, e.g., Claeys, supra note 11, at 1549 (studying nineteenth century
regulatory takings cases); Kobach, supra note 57, at 1223–59 (studying antebellum
regulatory takings cases).
66. See Gold, supra note 57, at 228–40; Kobach, supra note 57, at 1223–59.
67. Claeys, supra note 11, at 1553.
68. 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
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the cases that incorporated the Takings Clause and invented regulatory
takings, respectively—when, in fact, both were due process decisions.70
Leaving these thought provoking arguments to one side, it is clear that
some of the cases used to support the standard account did not directly
ask whether a textual takings provision required compensation for the
economic effects of regulation. Some of the earliest decisions resolving
questions of compensation relied not on a textual takings provision, but
on natural rights principles.71 Many commonly cited cases that did
interpret a takings clause are better characterized as consequential rather
than regulatory takings decisions—that is, they concern the compensation
for damage resulting as a consequence of a physical taking,72 which
continues to be a contested issue today.73 Other commonly cited cases
did not discuss the issue of compensation, but rather involved disputes
about the scope of governmental power to regulate at all. Some of these
cases were closely akin to modern substantive due process challenges—
they involved assertions that a regulation exceeded the police power74—
69. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
70. Bradley C. Karkkainen, The Police Power Revisited: Phantom Incorporation
and the Roots of the Takings “Muddle,” 90 MINN. L. REV. 826, 843–52, 862–67 (2006)
(arguing that both decisions were due process decisions). Chicago B. & Q. R.R. Co. v.
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897); Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
71. See, e.g., Proprietors of Piscataqua Bridge v. N.H. Bridge, 7 N.H. 35, 66
(1834) (stating that as a matter of right and as one of the first principles of justice, due
compensation must be provided if one’s property is taken without consent); Sinnickson
v. Johnson, 17 N.J.L. 129, 151 (1839) (noting that it was settled principle of law to
provide just compensation for taking of private property for public use); Gardner v. Trs.
of Vill. of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162, 165–66 (N.Y. 1816) (explaining that the trustees
of the village were planning to divert the stream on plaintiff’s land, but plaintiff has a
legal right to the use of the water); Kobach, supra note 57, at 1229–32 (discussing
decisions which assert that natural law principles required compensation for takings).
72. See Commonwealth v. Coombs, 2 Mass. (2 Tyng) 489, 490 (1807) (barring
construction of a road where compensation procedures are not followed); Sinnickson, 17
N.J.L. at 151 (deciding that even though the statute did not provide for damages caused
by the erection of a dam, there is no bar for seeking such damages); Gardner, 2 Johns.
Ch. at 162 (compensating for consequential damages when trustees attempted to divert
stream on plaintiff’s land); Cooper v. Williams, 5 Ohio 391, 392–93 (1832) (determining
whether to assess damages for water diverted from the river to feed into the canal for the
public welfare); Kobach, supra note 57, at 1223–28 (distinguishing consequential and
regulatory takings).
73. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547, 558–62
(2001) (discussing concept of “derivative takings”); 4A JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON
THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 14.01 [2–3] (3d ed. 1992) (discussing consequential
damages).
74. See, e.g., Baker v. Boston, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 184, 194 (1831) (arguing that
police regulations to prevent public harm “are not void, although they may in some
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while others were reminiscent of enabling act questions—they involved
challenges to a local government’s action as ultra vires.75
Finally, a related problem that we also cannot know due to the limited
judicial record is how state courts would have interpreted the Federal
Takings Clause. In the statutory construction context, for example, both
A.J. Bellia and John Manning have argued that, in the early nineteenth
century, state courts routinely used an “equity of the statute” approach to
interpret state laws, but they employed a different, textualist approach to
interpret federal laws.76 Perhaps state court interpretations of state
compensation guarantees also might have departed in unexpected ways
from state court interpretations of the federal compensation guarantee.
State constitutions, after all, are very different documents than the Federal
Constitution. As local government law students learn on the first day of
class, states have plenary power, the federal government—at least
theoretically—does not. Perhaps a nineteenth century state court would
have, if presented with the opportunity, interpreted a compensation
requirement applied against a backdrop of limited, enumerated powers
more broadly—or, for that matter, more narrowly—than a similar provision
applied against a backdrop of plenary police powers.
III. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, I do not know whether the terms of the Takings Clause, as
originally understood, could have required compensation for a confiscatory
regulation—for example, a regulation that “denies all economically
beneficial or productive use of land.”77 I leave that puzzle to the historians,
along with a few others, which I hope will shed light on the sparse
historical record surrounding the ratification of the Takings Clause.

measure interfere with private rights without providing for compensation.”); Commonwealth
v. Tewksbury, 52 Mass. (11 Met.) 55, 58–59 (1846) (reasoning that a property owner
could be prevented from moving stones on his private beach without compensation to
prevent erosion, because such interference is not so severe as to warrant a taking worthy
of compensation); Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53 (1851) (upholding a
statute banning construction of wharfs beyond a certain point in the Boston Harbor).
75. See, e.g., Mayor of N.Y. v. Ordrenan, 12 Johns. 121 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1815)
(allowing regulation of the storage of gunpowder); Tanner v. Vill. of Albion, 5 Hill 121
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843) (approving regulation of the operation of a bowling alley).
76. See Bellia, supra note 60, at 1506–07; John F. Manning, Textualism and the
Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 86 n.336 (2001).
77. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
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